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Background
In modem economy firms increasingly use international alliances to access strategic 
resources. Knowledge transfer in strategic alliances has been extensively studied in the 
recent years. Knowledge protection is another significant phenomenon that contributes 
to alliance and firm performance. This issue becomes even more important when 
complex technological know-how is involved. However, despite wide recognition of 
importance, knowledge protection in strategic alliances has been largely neglected. The 
present thesis attempts to fill this gap and to provide a basis for further research.
Objective of the Study
This study analyzes how a firm can protect its core competencies in the context of an 
international contract-based strategic alliance when complex technological know-how is 
involved. This problem is especially challenging due to the fact that there are fewer 
means for protection of complex technological knowledge within a contract-based 
alliance.
Research Methods
The problem is first analyzed from a theoretical point of view. The resulting framework 
is used to build a case study of an Austrian firm Swarco Futurit. Four interviews with 
the top management of the company were conducted in the form of guided discussion.
Findings
A framework was developed linking knowledge protection and influencing factors such 
as: firm specific characteristics, knowledge characteristics, perceived partner 
characteristics and relational characteristics. Using the empirical findings the framework 
was revised to include risk perception of managers as an important factor affecting 
knowledge protection levels. This thesis integrated various approaches to knowledge 
protection into a holistic framework that can be drawn on for further research in this 
relatively new area.
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In modern economy the global factor markets are becoming more and more open. In 
this environment knowledge has become one of the key drivers of competitive 
advantage (Teece 1998). As a result, firms need to pay ever increasing attention to 
knowledge management issues. These issues become even more important in the 
context of strategic alliances; it is no wonder then, that knowledge management in 
strategic alliances has recently been studied in great detail both theoretically and 
empirically (Eunni et al. 2006). Most of the existing research, however, has 
concentrated on knowledge creation and transfer, leaving knowledge protection 
relatively under-researched.
Many alliances are created specifically for the sake of knowledge and capability access, 
which makes firms lower their barriers for more efficient cooperation and improved 
alliance performance (Hamel 1991, Mowery et al. 1996, Inkpen & Beamish 1997, Das 
& Teng 2000). In case of complex products and services like high-tech systems, 
knowledge transfer issues become extremely important (Gulati & Singh 1998). 
Knowledge can often be transferred even when there is no strategic intent on both sides. 
Unintended knowledge transfer is one of the reasons for alliance failure (Das & Teng 
2003), and yet, in many cases managers act reactively to problems that arise, instead of 
proactively analyzing the potential risks, and ways to handle them. To preserve the 
competitive advantage and ensure successful cooperation, alliance managers have to 
balance the protection of their firms’ know-how vs. the needs of effective cooperation 
(Kale et al. 2000, Norman 2002, Jolly 2004).
On one hand when knowledge is codifiable, intellectual property rights protection 
methods can be used: such as copyrights, patents or trademarks (Hall 1992, 1993). On 
the other hand, when complex technologies with a lot of tacit know-how are involved,
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equity-based strategic alliances such as international joint ventures or wholly-owned 
subsidiaries are often used to mitigate the risks of knowledge transfer (Kogut & 
Zander 1993, Mowery et al. 1996, Das & Teng 1996). However, there are cases when 
other factors, than the concerns associated with the presence of complex technologies, 
affect alliance structure, and a firm enters a contract-based relationship (Gulati & Singh 
1998, Barney 1999, Williamson 2002). In this case the firm has to find other means and 
strategies to lower the risks of such cooperation, and protect its core competencies from 
appropriation by the alliance partner.
This thesis will analyze the existing literature to integrate existing approaches to 
knowledge protection from the point of view of the technology supplier firm. A case of 
an Austrian firm Swarco Futurit will be studied to improve the understanding of the 
issue. The paper will concentrate on the situation when knowledge protection is the 
most challenging: when knowledge is tacit and when the relationship is contract-based. 
The fact that the knowledge is tacit removes most of the formal legal means to protect 
it. The fact that the relationship is contract based leaves the firm without the equity 
controls that could be used to reduce the risks of cooperation and partner opportunism.
1.2. Research Gap
Knowledge creation, transfer and application in strategic alliances have been studied by 
a number of scholars (Hamel 1991, Inkpen & Beamish 1997, Inkpen 1998, Khanna et 
al. 1998, Simonin 1999). Knowledge protection on the other hand, despite wide 
recognition of importance (Dierickx & Cool 1989, Hamel et al. 1989, Oliver 1997, Fahy 
2000, Hoffmann & Schlosser 2001, Das & Teng 2003, Zhao 2004, Simonin 2004), has 
received far less attention from researchers. The relatively few existing studies have 
either concentrated on one or two aspects of knowledge transfer, or have been too wide 
to provide enough insight specifically into complex knowledge protection within 
contract-based alliances. Baughn et al. (1997) have presented a generalized framework 
overview, noting different factors that can contribute to the risks within strategic 
alliances, and mechanisms of mitigating these risks. Lorange (1997) described black­
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box strategies for protection of core competencies in general. Influence of relational 
capital on control and proprietary asset protection in alliances was studied by Kale et al. 
(2000) and Folkesson (2006). Finally, the way various factors affect the extent and 
selection of knowledge protection mechanisms was studied by Makhija & Ganesh 
(1997), Norman (2002) and González-Alvarez & Nieto-Antolin (2005).
Many authors recommend equity-based alliances for limiting risks when complex 
technological know-how is involved (Kogut & Zander 1993, Gulati 1995, Das & Teng 
1996, Mowery et. al 1996, Inkpen 1998, Gulati & Singh 1998). Generally in the context 
of knowledge management equity-based alliances have received the more attention in 
the literature than contract-based alliances (Beamish 1987, Hennart 1988, Harrigan 
1988, Kogut 1988, Yan & Gray 1994, Inkpen & Beamish 1997, Luo 2002). However, it 
is often the case that firms don’t have an option of entering into an equity-based 
relationship with a partner and instead establish a contract-based partnership.
To the best of the author’s knowledge there have been few attempts at taking a more 
unified look at complex knowledge protection in strategic alliances. The present 
research will attempt to integrate existing approaches and create an integrated 
framework for analyzing how various firm and alliance factors affect risks and 
knowledge protection choices in contract-based strategic alliances. The research will 
use a case study to further develop and improve the framework.
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1.3. Research Problem and Questions
To fill the above research gap the research problem can be formulated as follows:
0 How can a firm protect its core competencies in the context of an international 
contract-based strategic alliance when complex technological know-how is 
involved?
To find a solution to this problem this study will attempt to find answers to the 
following questions:
D What are the factors affecting knowledge protection within a contract-based 
strategic alliance?
° What mechanisms are available for knowledge protection in the context of a 
contract-based strategic alliance?
° How do these various factors affect the choice of the knowledge protection 
mechanisms?
1.4. Definitions and Limitations
This study will concentrate on alliances where high technology knowledge is involved. 
Grant (1996) describes such knowledge as highly complex and requiring integration of 
different but complementary knowledge. Formal means of protection such as patents, 
copyrights and license agreements are generally not applicable in this case.
Analogously to Parkhe (1993c) and Gulati & Singh (1998), strategic alliances will be 
defined as any sustained voluntary cooperative agreements between firms that involve 
complex cooperation and sharing of resources and capabilities. Due resource 
limitations, this research will only consider international alliances, and will not go into 
problematics of domestic alliances, which can be very different in different regions of
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the world. The study will take a look at the dynamics of the behavior within the alliance 
as opposed to the choices made prior to entering the alliance; more specifically the issue 
of knowledge protection will be studied within contract-based relations, where equity 
controls are unavailable. These relations for example can take a form of joint R&D 
arrangement, joint production, distribution agreements, technology swap, buyer-supplier 
relationship, and others (Das & Teng 1998b).
The term control will be used according to Das & Teng (1998a) as "a regulatory process 
by which the elements of a system are made more predictable through the establishment 
of standards in the pursuit of some desired objective or state"
Knowledge protection will be viewed as a form of control. Similarly to Green & Welsh 
(1988) knowledge protection strategy is not be limited to formally designed plans, but 
will be treated as a general approach a firm has towards knowledge protection. The 
mechanisms employed don’t have to be a part of a carefully designed strategy, but there 
can be ad hoc measures that have evolved over the years of operation under various 
influences.
In the same manner as in Norman (2002), this study will adopt a perspective of one 
partner within the alliance - the focal firm, since both partners can be considered facing 
symmetrical issues and decisions related to knowledge protection within the alliance.
1.5. Thesis Structure
The structure of the thesis will be based around the research problem and questions. 
First the paper will provide the grounding for the rest of the thesis by presenting the 
resource-based view of the strategic alliances. It will then proceed to explain the reasons 
behind contract-based alliances, and specify in more detail what kind of alliances the 
study is about. An international dimension of strategic alliances will also be briefly 
described. Next, knowledge transfer mechanisms will be presented to show where
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knowledge protection might be needed. Various factors affecting knowledge protection 
need and extent will be evaluated, followed by the description of current approaches to 
knowledge protection in strategic alliances. The literature review will be concluded 
with a proposal of an integrated framework for evaluation of knowledge protection 
issues and devising knowledge protection strategies in international contract-based 
strategic alliances.
The paper will proceed to describe the methodology employed for the empirical 
research. The reasons for using a case study of one firm will be explained. After that the 
findings of the empirical research will be presented and discussed. Based on the analysis 
a revised framework will be proposed. Summary of the paper, scientific contribution, 
managerial implications and suggestions for future research will conclude the thesis.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Alliance Structuring: Contract-Based Alliances
Due to complexity of the phenomenon, numerous theories have been used to analyze 
strategic alliances: such as transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975, 1985; Hennart 
1988), game theory (Parkhe 1993c), resource based view (Wemerfelt 1984, Barney 
1991), real options theory, resource dependence model, organizational learning, etc. 
Alliances are essentially used to gain access to resources of other firms; hence among 
the mentioned theories it is probably the resource-based view that provides the best 
foundation for analyzing the knowledge transfer between partners within a strategic 
alliance (Das & Teng 1998b, 2000, Peng 2001).
This section will first introduce a resource-based view of strategic alliances to provide 
the basis for the analysis. It will then continue to describe the alliance process to provide 
a context for the knowledge transfer and protection, and explain why firms can choose a 
contact-based alliance structure even though knowledge transfer is involved. Finally an 
international dimension of the problem will be presented.
2.1.1. Resource-Based View of Strategic Alliances
Unlike previous economic theories that were looking at the environment, resource- 
based view concentrates on the intrinsic properties of the firm: resources that define the 
firms’ capabilities (Barney 2001). Some of these resources due to their value, 
immobility and non-substitutability, are the ones that contribute to long-term firm 
heterogeneity and lead to a sustained competitive advantage (Reed & DeFillippi 1990).
Fahy (2000) sums up this view in a model linking key resources, management’s 
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Figure 1: A resource-based model of sustainable competitive advantage.
Adapted from Fahy (2000)
The figure suggests that not all resources are of equal value to sustainable competitive 
advantage; hence management’s strategic choices are vital in identification, 
development, deployment and protection of these resources. Even though this study will 
concentrate on protection of the key resources within a strategic alliance, it can be 
clearly seen that protection is tightly linked with other management processes and 
characteristics of the resources themselves.
Knowledge is argued to be the most strategically-significant resource of the firm (Grant 
1996), and any company involved in technology business has to take knowledge 
transfer especially seriously. Complex technological know-how is one of the most 
important resources contributing to a sustainable competitive advantage, since it tends 
to have all the required attributes: value, rareness, inimitability and non-substitutability 
(Barney 1991, 2001, Fahy 2000). Complex technologies are often embedded within the 
organization since they tend to consist of many interlinked parts such as product 
knowledge, product development knowledge, process technologies, manufacturing 
know-how, etc.
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The fact, that strategic resources are highly immobile and non-substitutable, is actually 
one of the major reasons for firms to create strategic alliances (Das & Teng 2000). 
Firms use alliances to gain access to such resources when it is impossible or costly to 
obtain them on the open market (Barney 1999). For example, when a company is 
entering a foreign market, it might be forced to use a local partner, to circumvent 
government restrictions, or to obtain local market knowledge (Beamish 1987, Y an & 
Gray 1994, Baughn et al. 1997). A government contract of a local firm can be 
considered a unique and valuable resource, which makes this firm an attractive partner. 
A similar resource which is especially important in developing markets is local 
networking: good relations with local officials and organizations. It is often the case that 
the firm contributes technological knowledge and the partner contributes local 
networking (Jolly 2004). In these kinds of cases the focal firm does not necessarily 
intend to transfer high-tech knowledge within the alliance, but due to the nature of the 
firm’s products and close cooperation within the alliance this knowledge becomes more 
accessible for the partner. In this situation even in the absence of opportunistic behavior 
unintended transfer can easily occur.
2.1.2. Alliance Process
It is evident that a solution to the knowledge transfer protection problem begins by 
acknowledging and analyzing all relevant aspects of an alliance, and only then devising 
strategies for solving this problem. This section will present the view of Baughn et al. 
(1997) on the alliance process specifically in the context of knowledge protection, and 
then identify the stages relevant to the present study.
Baughn et al. (1997) break down the alliance process into four stages:
1. Assessments prior to initiating the alliance
2. Bargaining and initial alliance structuring
3. Managing and controlling the alliance
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4. Evolution and trust in alliance relationships
The first stage involves assessing the value and properties of intellectual capital 
involved in the alliance. Components that are most likely to be subject to inadvertent 
transfer should be identified. Possible competitive consequences of alliance partner 
gaining the intellectual assets should be evaluated. For example if for the alliance 
counterpart the unstated goal has been to obtain these capabilities, they will not need the 
alliance as soon as they achieve this goal, and are now more competitive than they were 
before entering the alliance. This also means that one has to anticipate the partner intent 
and potential for learning and evaluate own transparency (Hamel 1991). Baughn et al. 
(1997) have noticed that firms often underestimate partners’ willingness and capacity 
for learning. Nevertheless even when the partner does not have a strategic intent to 
leam, they may absorb and use important knowledge gained from the alliance.
The next stage is bargaining and initial alliance structuring. Bargaining is greatly 
affected by the power relationship between the firms, which in turn is dependent on the 
needed resources that the focal firm controls and on the extent to which the other firm 
lacks alternative providers for these resources (Bacharach & Lawler 1981, Baughn et al. 
1997). As mentioned above there may also be external influences on bargaining such as 
government regulations in a local market. The resulting structure of the alliance defines 
initial flow of assets and the amount of interaction between the firms. Even though the 
alliance structure has a great effect on knowledge transfer within the alliance, one must 
be aware that the formal agreements often cover only a portion of knowledge and 
capabilities that could potentially migrate between the partners.
The third stage is managing and controlling the alliance. This is where cooperation and 
“race to leam” take place (Hamel 1991) and where risks of unintended transfers and 
opportunistic behavior are the highest. Baughn et al. (1997) recommend that the 
operating interfaces within the alliances should not be left to chance, but should be 
carefully designed and managed.
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The relationship within the alliance is dynamic and evolving based on changing market 
conditions and inter-partner interactions. This evolution is the fourth stage. Changes in 
the external and internal environment mean that, if the alliance is to survive for a longer 
duration, the alliance structure from the start should provide some flexibility.
This alliance process of Baughn et al. (1997) described above can be presented in a 
simple diagram (Figure 2).
Evolution and 











Figure 2: Alliance process and the focus of the study
The highlighted stages of the process are the focus of the present study, since alliance 
structure (being the contract-based alliance), is already selected. However some 
assessment and reassessment mentioned in the first stage has to be done within all 
stages to accommodate for alliance dynamics. Bargaining also continues during alliance 
evolution as partners’ positions often change in relation to markets and development of 
their own capabilities (Yan & Gray 1994, Inkpen & Beamish 1997, Makhija & Ganesh 
1997).
2.1.3. Contract-Based Strategic Alliances
When entering into a strategic alliance there are various ways to structure the 
relationship. Barney (1999) and Williamson (2002) suggest transaction cost theory 
reasoning for analyzing the choice between different types of governance structures, 
such as making a purely market transaction, having a long term contract, making an 
equity alliance or acquiring a capability. Every next choice reduces the risks of
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opportunism, but is more costly than the last, since it will involve more complex 
governance mechanisms.
Formal agreements have little effect on learning (Hamel 1991), and consequently the 
success of the partner in alliance. That’s why alliance structure is often used to both 
improve knowledge transfer and to protect key resources from appropriation (Roehl & 
Truitt 1987). Many authors have pointed out that complex technologies are more likely 
to be transferred within an equity alliance (Kogut & Zander 1993, Mowery et al. 1996, 
Inkpen 1998). This is done to retain a high degree of control over the knowledge 
transfer processes. An equity-based alliance also allows better options for monitoring 
these processes.
However there are cases when other considerations then purely knowledge transfer 
issues must be taken into account. According to Barney (1999) the following reasons for 
using a contract-based alliance instead of an acquisition or an equity-based alliance can 
be identified:
° Legal constraints
° Acquisition may reduce value of the capabilities
° Acquisition or equity relationship may be costly to reverse
D There may be substantial “unwanted baggage” inextricably tied with the 
desired capabilities
D Leveraging acquired capabilities can be costly
° Governance costs of an equity-based alliance are higher than those of a 
contract-based alliance
This study is focusing on the cases when the structure is already chosen - a contract- 
based strategic alliance. Such alliances don’t involve sharing or exchange of equity nor
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creation of a new organizational entity, and thus can be negotiated relatively quickly. 
Employees of the partners usually work together within their own organizational 
hierarchies, since even when personnel transfer is involved they remain responsible to 
their employers.
Non-equity alliances often allow a lesser degree of control. It is impossible to describe 
every circumstance and eventuality in a contract, and even more so when knowledge 
transfer is involved. Contract-based alliances are thus vulnerable to opportunistic 
behavior, and disagreements regarding ownership of the jointly developed intellectual 
property may arise (Baughn et al. 1997).
Non-equity alliance can be split into two categories: bilateral contract-based alliances 
and unilateral contract-based alliances (Gulati 1995, Das & Teng 2000). The unilateral 
contract-based alliance has a well defined transfer of property rights. This kind of 
alliance is usually limited to licensing, distribution and some R&D agreements. The 
main distinguishing feature of this alliance structure is that the organizations can carry 
out their tasks independently of each other. This implies that the level of integration in 
such alliances is low. Tacit knowledge is rarely transferred in such alliances, and 
explicit knowledge is often covered by detailed and specific contacts (Hagedoom & 
Hesen 2007).
The present study is focused more on bilateral contract-based alliances that imply a 
joint sustained production of property rights: for example joint R&D, joint marketing, 
joint production or complex long-term supplier-buyer relationships. These kind of 
contracts are usually incomplete and open-ended (Das & Teng 2000), and imply a 
higher level of integration. This type of non-equity partnership is preferable when the 
collaboration is short-term and project-based (Hagedoom & Hesen 2007), but at the 




In addition to gaining access to partners’ resources and capabilities, strategic alliances 
are an important means of internationalization (Yoshino & Rangan 1995, Buckley & 
Casson 1998a, 1998b). To reduce the internationalization costs and risks firms often use 
partners to help with production, technologies, marketing, local connections, laws and 
regulations (Beamish 1987). Knowledge protection issues become especially prominent 
in international alliances. Cross-borer alliances span different legal environments and 
cultural attitudes regarding intellectual property rights (Baughn et al. 1997, Jolly 2004). 
Levels of available protection can also vary substantially. This is especially noticeable 
when a firm from a developed market enters a developing market, when not only legal 
protection is unavailable, but even the requirement for such protection is not well 
understood and accepted. Based on the personal experience of the author in 
international projects in Russia and Ukraine, it is often the case that in these markets 
knowledge is not treated as something of great value compared to tangible resources, 
when considering buying decisions. Interestingly enough this attitude is often combined 
with a very high willingness to learn from a foreign technology partner, i.e. knowledge 
is considered important, something that should be learned, but not something that 
should be paid for. To compensate for the risks of cross-border cooperation a significant 
share of international alliances is equity based.
In the international strategic alliances government involvement may affect the choice of 
the alliance structure. In addition, when the government is a prominent partner, a legal 
framework cannot always be relied upon to enforce an agreement (Baughn et al. 1997), 
since the government structures can often affect how the legal framework is applied.
In many cross-border alliances, the differences in partners’ contributions are clearly 
visible (Jolly 2004). A foreign partner usually comes into alliance with new 
technologies and products, marketing knowledge, finance and management expertise. A 
local partner often contributes local work force, land, local relations and local market
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knowledge. Both parties want to learn the expertise of the partner, and both parties want
4
to limit the learning of the other partner.
To sum up, knowledge protection in international strategic alliances is facing a 
significantly different environment compared to domestic alliances. The complexity is 
increased since with every new country present in the alliances another legal and 
cultural environment is added into the mix.
2.3. Factors Affecting Knowledge Protection in Strategic Alliances
This section will analyze the first research question: what are the factors affecting 
knowledge protection within an international contract-based strategic alliance? The 
section will begin by describing the knowledge transfer processes, and specifying which 
processes are the most important in the context of complex knowledge and contract- 
based alliances. It will then proceed to take a look at firm specific characteristics that 
can affect knowledge protection in the alliance. After that, other factors affecting the 
extent and the need for knowledge protection will be analyzed. The factors can be 
grouped as firm specific characteristics, knowledge characteristics, partner 
characteristics and relational characteristics.
2.3.1. Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms in Strategic Alliances
One of the core purposes of strategic alliances is to facilitate and manage knowledge 
transfer (Mowery et al. 1996, Das & Teng 2000). Knowledge protection should be 
discussed in relation to the actual knowledge transfer processes employed in the 
alliances, since these processes are also the most likely route for unintended knowledge 
transfer.
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Inkpen (1998) identifies four generic management processes that create a path for 
knowledge transfer between alliance partners:
° personnel transfers 
D technology sharing
D interactions such as regular communication, visits and tours 
° linkages between strategies
Personnel transfers allow employees of one partner to get directly immersed in the 
environment of the other partner, which definitely reduces the barriers for tacit 
knowledge transfer. Technology sharing is defined by Inkpen (1998) as a mechanism 
that provides access mainly to explicit knowledge, such as specifications, 
documentation and technology demonstrations. Various direct interactions between 
partners such as regular communication, visits and tours provide means for transfer of 
both explicit and tacit knowledge. And finally the linkage between strategies allows for 
better understanding between the partner organizations, which in turn facilitates all 
types of knowledge transfer.
In the context of transfer of complex technological know-how within a contract-based 
alliance only two of these processes are within the scope of this study: personnel 
transfers and various other interactions (regular communication, visits, tours, etc). 
Technology sharing as defined by Inkpen (1998) is not applicable, since it is mostly 
used for the transfer of explicit knowledge. Protection for explicit knowledge has been 
studied extensively, and can usually be achieved through IPRs and contracts. Linkages 
between strategies are hard to achieve without common equity, which puts this 
management process outside of the scope of this study too.
All of the above processes facilitate both intended and unintended knowledge transfers. 
This means that without any control mechanisms they can be dangerous, since the
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partner could acquire critical knowledge vital to the competitive advantage of the focal 
firm. To evaluate the need for control mechanisms for knowledge protection, the firm 
should first consider its own characteristics, and then evaluate characteristics of the 
knowledge involved, partner characteristics and relational characteristics (Baughn et al. 
1997, Norman 2002).
2.3.2. Firm Specific Characteristics
Various firm specific factors can affect the resulting knowledge protection strategies: 
firm’s goals within the alliances, prior experience in managing the alliances, ownership 
of complementary assets. Focal firm characteristics are especially important in the 
context of contract-based alliances, since there is no common entity created by the 
partners.
Goals within alliances
Strategic goals within the alliance will define the extent of cooperation between the 
partners (Gulati & Singh 1998). This will affect the knowledge transfer mechanisms, 
which will in turn affect the required knowledge protection measures.
Experience with managing strategic alliances
Experience of managing strategic alliances can affect how company approaches 
knowledge protection in the alliance (Norman 2002). Negative experiences with partner 
opportunism may cause the firms to establish stricter and more formal knowledge 
protection mechanisms, whereas absence of such experiences will lower the perceived 
risk and hence the protection level.
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Ownership of complementary assets
An important factor that can affect the level of protection is a possible requirement of 
complementary assets to successfully exploit the acquired knowledge. Knowledge in 
many cases is an intermediate good and before it can be sold, it has to be packaged into 
a product or service. Hence the absence of complementary assets may limit the 
usefulness of acquired knowledge to the partner (Teece 1998; Anand & Galetovic 
2004). These complementary assets can be patents, related technologies, access to 
financing, access to customers, manufacturing capabilities. If a complementary asset on 
its own is not available on the factor market it becomes a bottle neck to exploiting the 
acquired knowledge, thus reducing the risks associated with knowledge appropriation 
by the partner.
2.3.3. Knowledge Protection Level
The level of knowledge protection in a strategic alliance depends on how a firm 
evaluates its risks in the alliance (Norman 2002). When the perceived risks are high, the 
firms will be more protective of their critical knowledge. Norman (2002) separates the 
factors that influence the level of protection into two groups: resource characteristics 
and relational characteristics. Baughn et al. (1997) separate these factors a bit 
differently: into resource characteristics and partner characteristics. Hence the factors 
influencing the level of protection can be summed up in the following way:
° Knowledge characteristics 




Knowledge characteristics that affect the protection level are the importance of 
knowledge to the core competency of the firm, tacitness of the knowledge and causal 
ambiguity associated with this knowledge (Norman 2002, González-Alvarez & Nieto- 
Antolin, 2005).
Core knowledge and capabilities will be protected much more carefully than peripheral 
knowledge, since according to RBV the potential loss of core knowledge to the partner 
will very likely affect long-term competitiveness of the firm (Dierickx & Cool 1989, 
Norman 2002).
Tacitness of knowledge is another significant characteristic that affects the level of 
protection. Tacit knowledge due to is very nature is harder to transfer (Kogut & Zander 
1993, Teece 1998). However, it is hard to protect technological knowledge in strategic 
alliances due to the closeness and duration of cooperation (Das & Teng 1998b), and 
since alliances actually simplify the transfer of tacit knowledge, firms view 
appropriation of tacit knowledge as more serious than the appropriation of explicit 
knowledge (Norman 2002).
Causal ambiguity improves knowledge protection by making the associated knowledge 
harder to imitate for the partner. At the same time it also makes it harder to use this 
knowledge for the focal firm itself. King & Zeithaml (2001) and González-Alvarez & 
Nieto-Antolin (2005) in their studies have found out that the negative effect of causal 
ambiguity on the focal firm performance is greater than the positive effect of protection 
of the technological know-how. This implies that the use of causal ambiguity for 
knowledge protection is of limited value.
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Perceived partner characteristics
The level of protection is also affected by the perceived learning intent and absorptive 
capacity of the partner (Norman 2002).
The perceived learning intent of the alliance partner is the extent to which the focal firm 
believes that the partner is focused on appropriating knowledge in the alliance. 
Sometimes the partner is satisfied with access to the knowledge and capabilities in the 
alliance and is not actively seeking to acquire and internalize this knowledge (Inkpen 
1998, Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004). In this case the motivation to learn can be quite low, 
and fewer protection measures are required. When the firm perceives its partner as 
highly motivated to learn and to internalize the knowledge, it is more likely to control 
the knowledge transfer process (Norman 2002). This motivation can be observed 
through the amount of resources the partner is assigning to the knowledge transfer 
within the alliance (Simonin 1999). The more resources are assigned the more seriously 
the knowledge transfer is treated by the partner.
Learning intent on its own is not sufficient for a successful knowledge transfer. 
Absorptive capacity is the ability of the partner to receive, adapt and internalize the 
knowledge (Teece 1998). This ability is greatly affected by the resource overlap 
between the alliance partners. The more related is the knowledge of the partners, the 
easier it is to absorb the knowledge. Hence when a firm perceives its partners 




Norman (2002) also cites trust within the alliance as an important characteristic 
affecting firm’s actions within the alliance. When a firm trusts its partner, it is more 
likely to make itself more vulnerable to opportunistic actions of the partner. At the same 
time the openness lowers the costs and improves the efficiency of knowledge transfer, 
and hence is likely to improve alliance performance (Kale et al. 2000).
It is important to differentiate between knowledge-based trust and deterrence-based trust 
(Gulati 1995, Kale et al. 2000). Knowledge-based trust develops when partners interact 
with each other and learn about each other, thus making the partner behavior more 
predictable based on knowledge about the partner. Deterrence-based trust is built upon 
strictly utilitarian grounds, when the firm believes that the partner will behave in a 
trustworthy manner due to the negative consequences outweighing potential benefits 
that may arise in case of opportunistic behavior.
Relations outside the alliance can also affect the way the firm treats knowledge 
protection. As Reed & DeFillippi (1990) point out - the relationship between the firm 
and the customer produces ambiguity for rivals and creates a barrier to imitation. In 
addition, long term relationships with the customers, suppliers and government agencies 
can deny the same relations to the potential competitors.
2.4. Knowledge Protection Mechanisms in Strategic Alliances
This section will analyze the second research question: What mechanisms are available 
for knowledge protection in the context of a contract-based strategic alliance? As 
previously mentioned, not all possible knowledge protection mechanisms are applicable 
in this context. First an existing model by Makhija & Ganesh (1997) will be presented. 
The model links the nature of learning involved and the nature of appropriate control 
mechanisms. Mechanisms appropriate in the context of this study will be pointed out. 















2.4.1. The Relationship between Learning of Capabilities and Control Mechanisms
Makhija & Ganesh (1997) hypothesized a model (Table 1) in which the choice of 
control mechanisms would be linked to the nature of the knowledge involved. Highly 
codifiable knowledge requires lower-order learning and can be managed through more 
formal mechanisms such as contracts. The more implicit knowledge, such as for 
example manufacturing processes or incremental innovations, requires higher order- 
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Patents and Licenses 
Skilled Personnel
Formal Authority Relationships 
Standardized Procedures & Rules 
Planning & Budgeting
Incremental Innovation:
















Teams & Task Forces
Meetings & Organized Personal Contact
Transfer of Managers / Lateral Movements
Rituals, Traditions and Ceremonies 
(reinforcing shared values and beliefs)
V
Informal
Table 1: The relationship between learning of capabilities and control mechanisms
(Makhija & Ganesh 1997)
However the model is only partially applicable to the present study. This research is 






whereas all of the hierarchical control mechanisms and some of the less formal 
mechanisms and suggested by Makhija & Ganesh (1997) are easier to implement within 
an equity-based alliance. The fact that the knowledge is transferred within a contract- 
based strategic alliance greatly narrows down the selection of available mechanisms. In 
general, the means of control related to structure and hierarchy in a contract-based 
alliance are not available due to absence of common entity, which leaves mostly internal 
resource and relational controls (Astley et al. 1984). x
2.4.2. Relational Capital and Knowledge Protection
One way to curb opportunistic behavior in the absence of contractual or structural 
means is to build up trust-based relational capital (Das & Teng 1998a, Kale et al. 2000). 
Relational governance may help to overcome the limitations of contracts, when tacit 
knowledge is involved (Poppo & Zenger 2002). In general in recent years many 
researchers have come to the conclusion that formal contracts and trust between partner 
organizations are likely to act as complements and improve the outcomes of cooperation 
(Poppo & Zenger 2002, Luo 2002)
Trust between organizations can be considered as the agglomeration of trust between 
the individuals (Kale et al. 2000). Daily interactions among employees involved in the 
alliance help to develop interpersonal relations and trust (Baughn et al. 1997). Strong 
interpersonal ties both create a path for learning about other firm’s capabilities and at 
the same time provide information about partner’s reliability (Kale et al. 2000). This 
relational protection can also be described as partner’s commitment not to act 
opportunistically even in the absence of formal limitations, and hence not to attempt to 
either appropriate knowledge or use this knowledge to the detriment of the focal firm.
Deterrence based trust can also be developed, and threat of retaliation is one way to 
accomplish it. Anand & Galetovic (2004) mentions a threat of intensified competition 
when important resources are appropriated. This is especially applicable in the case of 
horizontal strategic alliance, when it is likely that partners are present on the same
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product market. Lorange (1997) proposes another type of threat - cutting off the partner 
from future developments in technological know-how by the focal firm. For this type of 
threat to be effective the firm has to regularly signal its developments to the other party. 
This type of threat is applicable in both horizontal and vertical strategic alliances. 
Existence of such threats from the focal firm, reduces the incentive of the partner to 
misbehave and to act opportunistically, and hence reduces the need for other means of 
knowledge protection.
2.4.3. Internal Structures and Employee Discipline
A number or researchers suggest using internal structures and employee specific 
measures to reduce unintended knowledge transfer. Baughn et al. (1997) suggest 
erecting a “collaborative membrane” that will be used to manage the flows of 
knowledge and skills. Creating a “collaborative membrane” implies that partner 
interface points should be defined, staffed appropriately, and continuously monitored. 
While such a membrane will limit the unintended transfers it will at the same time make 
it harder to transfer perfectly valid resources required for the success of the alliance. 
Hamel et al. (1989) point out that limiting the unintended transfers in the end depends 
on loyalty of the employees.
2.5. Theoretical Framework
Comfortable relation within the alliance does not necessarily mean that all partners are 
benefiting equally in terms of increased competitiveness (Hamel 1991). One has to 
acknowledge “transparency by default” and “transparency by design" and to improve 
the gains from participating in an alliance a firm should be proactive in both learning 
and protecting its core competencies.
Complex tacit knowledge is hard to imitate, but alliance partners purposefully lower 
barriers to transferability to exchange knowledge. This makes knowledge-based 
resources more vulnerable to unintended transfers (Das & Ten g 2000, Jolly 2004). One
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partner might behave opportunistically and attempt to outleam the other (Hamel 1991). 
Even without a strategic intent, that partner may absorb and use important knowledge 
gained from the alliance (Baughn et al. 1997). This is why companies must develop 
safety measures against unintended, informal transfers of information (Hamel et al. 
1989). At the same time alliance partners need to find a balance between protecting 
their intellectual capital and sharing knowledge that is required for carrying out the 
projects for which the alliance was created (Baughn et al. 1997).
Inkpen & Beamish (1997) recommend adoption of strict policies and shielding 
mechanisms to protect key competencies, but how can one do it effectively while doing 
the opposite: sharing some of the knowledge with the partner? Lorange (1997) on the 
other hand suggests flexible and dynamic contractual protection, latent retaliatory power 
and hands-on managerial involvement as a strategy for achieving cooperation while 
protecting core competencies.
Analysis of the existing literature has shown that many issues of knowledge 
management in strategic alliances have been studied. However there have been much 
fewer studies on knowledge protection and no research has attempted to build a holistic 
approach to evaluate knowledge protection in strategic alliances. Building heavily upon 
the literature review, an integrated framework has been developed (Figure 3). This 
framework attempts to provide a solution to the research problem of the study: How can 
a firm protect its core competencies in the context of an international contract-based 
strategic alliance when complex technological know-how is involved? The proposed 
framework takes into account the limitations imposed by the contract-based alliance 
structure and by the fact that resources that should be protected involve complex 
technological know-how.
Within this framework the focal firm should evaluate its own factors, knowledge 
characteristics, partner characteristics, and relational characteristics. These factors affect 
both knowledge transfer mechanisms and the choice of knowledge transfer mechanisms.
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Based on this analysis the firm should devise appropriate strategies for protecting the 
knowledge within the alliance while limiting the negative effects of this protection on 
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Figure 3: Theoretical framework of knowledge protection 
in a contract-based strategic alliance
The above mentioned factors will highlight the need for knowledge protection and 
should help the firm make informed decisions about designing appropriate knowledge 
protection strategy.
The following sections will briefly describe the parts of the model and how they affect 




Firm’s own characteristics and existing strategies should be evaluated in relation to 
knowledge transfer and protection:
D Firm’s experience in alliances in general 
D Strategic goals within the alliance 
D Ownership of complementary assets
These factors will most likely affect the need and the extent of protection more than the 
choice of actual protection mechanisms.
Knowledge Characteristics
Knowledge assets of the focal firm should be classified in relation to the firm’s goals 
within the alliance:
1. Knowledge that has to be transferred to the partner
2. Knowledge that has to be used to ensure the fulfillment of the common alliance 
goals, but that should not be appropriated by the partner
3. Knowledge that should not be transferred and should stay outside of the 
alliance
For the above groups (especially for the items 2 and 3) the following characteristics 
should be evaluated:
0 How valuable is the knowledge, how close is it to the core competencies of the 
focal firm?
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D Appropriability and barriers to duplication in the context of the alliance 
° Costs of protection vs. the benefits of alliance success
Value of the knowledge and costs of protection will affect the extent of required 
protection, whereas appropriability will affect both the extent of protection and the 
choice of mechanisms.
Partner Characteristics
Partner characteristics and potential for opportunistic behavior should be evaluated:
D What is the absorptive capacity of the partner? What is the knowledge overlap 
between the focal firm and the partner?
° Does the partner seem to have a strategic intent to outleam?
° Is the partner already in the same market? If not how likely is the partner to 
attempt to enter the market?
Partner characteristics will mostly affect the extent of protection.
Relational Characteristics
Various relational characteristics of the partnership should be considered:
° Issues of trust
■ Has the firm worked with the partner before?
■ What were the results of this cooperation?
• Are there a lot of personal ties between the parties?
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• Are there personal links between the companies?
D Relations outside the alliance that can affect relations within the alliance (e.g. 
relations with customers, suppliers, government agencies, etc)
Relational characteristics partially act as means of protection themselves; hence they 
will both affect the requirement for protection and other protection mechanisms that can 
used.
Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms
Based on the limitations of contract-based alliances and the fact that the complex 
technological know-how is tacit, the following transfer mechanisms are at the firm’s 
disposal:
D Personnel transfers 
D Regular communication, visits and tours
Both of these transfer mechanisms are most likely to affect the choices of the protection 
mechanisms, since protection only makes sense in the context of contacts between the 
partners. It is important to remember that even though a firm is not planning to transfer 
or provide access to some particular knowledge, simply due to the nature of long term 
cooperation, unintended transfers may happen even in the absence of opportunistic 
behavior of the partner.
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Knowledge Protection Strategy
Finally, based on the evaluations of the factors above, knowledge protection strategy 
should be devised:
° Internal structures: create and manage collaborative membrane
° Train employees, make sure that everyone communicating with the partner is 
aware of the firm’s strategy and risks associated with the alliance
° Build trust-based relationship capital
• With the partner to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior
• With other organizations (suppliers, customers, government agencies) to 
introduce ambiguity for competitors
° Build deterrence based trust for example by signaling retaliation in case of 
opportunistic behavior
It is important that in the firms where knowledge plays an important part, knowledge 
protection is handled more proactively. This way future risks may be reduced even 
before the damage is done.
3. Research Methodology
This section will discuss research methodology of the empirical study and the reasons 
for making the choices that were made. It will start by building the research design. It 
then will proceed to data collection and data validity. After that company and 
interviewee selection rationale will be presented followed by how the findings will be 
analyzed. Finally the data collection process as it happened will be described.
3.1. Research Design
Research design is the planning of the overall research strategy (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug 2002). The quality of the underlying research design greatly affects the 
quality of whole study. Research design is in turn influenced by many factors. One 
could group these factors into research specific and researcher specific. Research 
specific factors are basically research goals: what does the research intend to 
accomplish? Researcher specific factors are mainly constraints and limitations, such as: 
researcher qualifications, available time and resources, researcher’s personal goals.
Ghauri & Grønhaug (2002) provide a link between the research design and the problem 
structure.
Research design Problem Structure
Exploratory Unstructured
Descriptive Structure
Causal / Explanatory Structured
Table 2: Research design choices for various problem structures. 
Adapted from Ghauri & Grønhaug (2002)
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Exploratory research is used when the problem is not very well understood, and one has 
to get a deeper insight into the factors and processes that are involved in the problem. 
Descriptive and causal research methods are used in cases when the problem is well 
structured and understood.
Research methods can also be split up into qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative 
methods are focused on testing and verification, and use a very logical and critical 
approach. Usually the observer is quite distant from data, and hence more objective. The 
results of such research can usually be generalized to other similar situations.
Qualitative methods on the other hand have an emphasis on understanding through 
making observations in natural settings and interpreting these observations (Ghauri & 
Grønhaug 2002). Qualitative methods attempt to provide a holistic perspective on the 
subject, but possibilities of generalization of results are limited, only individual 
comparisons are usually possible.
Compared to other scientific fields in economics, international strategic alliances are a 
relatively new field of study, and due high level of complexity and the need for theory 
advancement qualitative methods are especially applicable (Parkhe 1993a). More 
specifically the issue of knowledge protection in contract-based international strategic 
alliances has not been studied in much detail yet. A combination of exploratory and 
explanatory research design will be used for this paper. A single case study of a 
technology firm will provide an insight into approaches to knowledge protection in the 
firm’s partnerships and will help to illustrate the model developed in the “framework” 
section of this thesis. This study will attempt to achieve a greater understanding of the 
issues involved, by observing and interpreting the observations, but without trying to 
generalize.
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Researcher factors have also affected the research design:
D Researcher goals: master’s thesis 
° Time constraints 
° Access to the case company
The first two points, i.e. the fact that it is a master’s thesis and the time limitations, 
reduce the scope and scale of the research. The author’s extensive access to the case 
company on the other hand, will permit a deeper understanding of the case.
3.2. Data Collection
Both primary and secondary data will be used for the case. Secondary data for the case 
will be collected from the company web site. This data will mostly be company 
background and some operational figures.
Gummesson (2003, 2005) suggests that all research is interpretive and methodologies 
should adapt to the complexities of the subject studied. Alliances, being extremely 
complex involving multiple perspectives, are a particularly complex subject that 
requires a flexible approach. That is why interviews in the form of guided 
conversations, where interviewer can steer the conversation depending on the 
information received, are especially suitable for investigating the sensitive knowledge 
protection issues. Due to time and resource limitations, and due to the fact that the case 
company is in Austria while the researcher is in Finland, the interviews will be 
conducted over a video conferencing program Skype. The sound will be recorded, so 
that it could be transcribed after the interview.
During the interview, the researcher will first ask permissions to use the company name, 
the interviewee names, and a permission to record the interview. Then the research will 
be briefly introduced, to give the respondent an idea of what aspects of their activities
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are of interest to the researcher. After that the interviewee will be asked to briefly 
describe his own status and tasks at the company.
The guiding questions are based around the theoretical framework developed in the 
previous sections (Figure 3 on page 28). First the questions about the firm itself and its 
alliances will be discussed to provide the context for the rest of the discussion (see 
Appendix: Interview Guide). After that various factors that affect knowledge protection 
within the alliance will be discussed: knowledge characteristics, partner characteristics 
and relational characteristics. Finally knowledge transfer mechanisms and knowledge 
protection strategies of the firm will be investigated.
3.3. Data Validity
To ensure the quality of data collected a number of tests should be passed (Yin 2003):
° Construct Validity 
° Internal Validity 
° External Validity 
° Reliability
Construct Validity
To ensure construct validity, four informants will be used within the case company and 
will be interviewed based on the same set of guiding questions. The interviewees will be 
selected as the ones most likely to be involved in the firm’s strategic alliances on 
various levels, from making overall strategic decisions to directly participating in 
everyday interactions. The respondents will also be asked to check the resulting report 
to find any errors or omissions.
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Internal Validity
Internal validity will be improved using an explanation building and logic model 
techniques. The explanations will use both the case and the framework developed in the 
literature review to analyze the collected data.
External Validity
External validity will also be improved by revising the framework based on the case and 
linking the case to the literature review. This way the revised framework can later be 
used for a multiple case study or a more quantitative approach.
Reliability
Data reliability will be ensured through sufficient description of case company 
selection, interviewee selection, interview process documentation, and through 
recordings of the interviews.
3.4. Case Company Selection
To illustrate and explore the framework developed in the literature review part of the 
study, the following criteria were used to select the case company:
D Presence of complex technological know-how 
° International presence 
0 Contract-based strategic alliances
D Possibility of interviewing sufficient number of persons within the time and 
resource limitations on various levels of the company
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An Austrian traffic signal manufacturer Swarco Futurit has fulfilled all of the criteria. 
The author was familiar with the company due to prior cooperation in various 
international projects.
3.5. Interviewee Selection
The criteria for the interviewee selection were the following:
° Knowledge of company strategy 
D Knowledge of company operations 
D Knowledge of company partnerships 
° Broad knowledge of technical issues 
° Sufficient time with the company
This meant that in a company the size of Swarco Futurit, managing directors and 
product managers would be the best sources of information. All managing directors of 
Swarco Futurit have kindly agreed to be interviewed. The permission to interview the 
product manager was received after the interviews with the directors. In addition, the 
managing director of Swarco Europe (the company that owns Swarco Futurit and is 
directly involved in its operations) was also interviewed to provide a more strategic 
perspective on the issues.
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Alexander Swarovski Managing Director Swarco Europe 13 years
Franz Silhengst Managing Director Swarco Futurit 23 years
(Technical Issues)
Friedrich Hofstadler Managing Director Swarco Futurit 18 years
(Marketing and Sales Issues)
Walter Popp Product Manager Swarco Futurit 3 years
(Railway Products)
Table 3: List ofpersons interviewed for the case study
3.6. Case Analysis
The findings will be analyzed by matching them to the framework developed in the 
literature review. New findings from the case will be used to further develop the 
framework. Using classification by Yin (2003) pattern matching and explanation 
building techniques will be used. The results should form a base for further research.
3.7. Interview Process
The case interviews were conducted during April and March of 2008. All interviewees 
gave a permission to use their name in the final report. The interviews lasted about 40 
minutes each and the audio was recorded with special plug-in software for a video 
conferencing program Skype. Two out of four interviews have been done with live 
video feed (Mr. Silhengst and Mr. Swarowski), and the remaining two - with audio 
only. Video conferencing over Skype has somewhat improved the quality of interaction 
compared to a basic phone conversation, but of course it is not a substitute to personal
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live communication. At the same time, in absence of many distractions present in 
personal face-to-face communications, the 40 minutes were used very efficiently to 
cover a lot of questions.
Mother tongue of all interviewees was German, but the interviews were made in 
English. As a result clarification of the questions in different terms was sometimes 
required. However all in all language and understanding were not an issue during the 
interviews.
Not all of the questions turned out to be applicable to the case, and to some 
interviewees. For example the product manger Mr. Wirth was not asked the questions 
related to overall company strategy.
Immediately after the first interview the guiding questions had to be revised somewhat. 
For example the phrase “strategic alliance” sounded too big and abstract to some of the 
interviewees, hence synonymous phrases were used, such as “long term partnership” or 
“long term cooperation”. From the context of the discussion it was clear that the 
partnerships of case company fully fall under the strategic alliance definition used in 
this study.
After every interview, all the answers were transcribed. After the last interview a 
complete case description was written up encompassing all the answers. The case 
description was sent to the interviewees asking for comments or corrections to find if 
there were any mistakes. Managing director of Swarco Futurit Mr. Silhengst has 
confirmed the accuracy of the information presented in the case.
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4. Case Study
The case study is structured in the following way: first the company background will be 
given to provide the context for the observations. Then the findings will be presented. 
The findings will be entirely descriptive using only the data from the interviewees. After 
that the findings will be discussed and analyzed in relation to the proposed framework. 
Finally a revised framework will be presented.
4.1. Company Background
The case company is Swarco Futurit, one of the world leaders in manufacturing of LED 
(Light Emitting Diode) traffic signs and traffic signals for both road and rail. Swarco 
Futurit is a leading company of the Traffic Management division of Swarco Group, a 
large multinational specializing in various traffic-related solutions. Swarco Futurit’s 
core competence is development of optical technologies for its traffic signs and signals. 
Various requirements and factors have to be taken into account when developing traffic 
signs and signals, for example: light intensity, clearness of the symbol display, solidity, 
weather resistance, energy consumption, requirements for maintenance and longevity.
In 2000 Swarco Futurit invested 10 million Euro into the construction of a new 
Technology and Development Center in Burgenland, Austria. This center houses 
production lines, injection molding machinery and professional testing and light 
measuring environments.
In addition to the manufacturing and product development Swarco Futurit provides 
customers with customized solutions and consulting services in the analysis and 
optimization of the traffic flows.
Structurally Swarco Futurit is a part of Swarco Europe which is in turn a part of Swarco 
Group. Swarco Futurit turnover for 2007 was about 55 million Euro out of 450 million
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of the whole Swarco Group. Swarco Futurit currently employs about 250 persons and 
has customers in over 60 countries worldwide.
4.2. Findings
This section will present the findings of the interviews. The findings will be structured 
according to the framework presented in the literature review, and are entirely based on 
the information from the interviewees. In addition to the information strictly relevant to 
the framework the findings will contain some context to improve understanding and 
possibly identify improvements for the framework.
First the section will present the company and its goals as told by the interviewees. Then 
it will describe the kind of knowledge that is core to Swarco Futurit and the kind of 
knowledge that is used in Swarco Futurit partnerships. It will then proceed to describe 
partners and relations with the partners s perceived by Swarco Futurit’s management. 
After that knowledge transfer and knowledge protection approaches will be described.
4.2.1. Swarco Futurit
Swarco Futurit according to all directors is a product company. It doesn’t sell 
technology or systems, but it manufactures and sells products. Major products of the 
company are railway traffic signals and variable message signs (VMS). According to 
Franz Silhengst, about 10 years ago there was a major strategy shift at the company, 
when it was decided to move out of the components and systems business. Swarco 
Futurit, for example, has stopped developing its own controllers for the signals, and 
concentrated on the actual traffic signals and signs. This way many former direct 
competitors became the firm’s suppliers and customers. The company picked a 
worldwide niche market where very few companies had deep knowledge and 
experience - optics for traffic signals and signs. In retrospect this strategic shift was a 
smart move: the turnover grew from 5 million Euro ten years ago to 55 million Euro 
today.
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To analyze knowledge protection in Swarco Futurit’s partnerships it is important to 
have a context of the market where the firm operates. Mr. Silhengst identified four 
major product levels in this industry:
Level Product Short Market Description
LED
Large volume manufacturing for
various applications
2 LED on electronic board
Large volume manufacturing for
various applications
LED on electronic board with an Medium volume, application
electronic driver specific
The whole unit with the signal:
enclosure, optics, LEDs, controllers
Niche market
Table 4: Product levels in the LED application market
Swarco Futurit operates on the fourth level of this chain. It develops and produces a 
complete final product with the required parameters. The following section will describe 
the knowledge involved in this activity.
4.2.2. Knowledge
All interviewees have practically identically identified the core competencies of Swarco 
Futurit:
D Design and production of plastic parts, usage of own tools 
° Light systems development, optics, lab research, simulations 
D Application of LEDs and semiconductors, energy savings, cost savings
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To explain this in a less technical language, Swarco Futurit is able to either take 
standard components, or order custom made components with special parameters, and 
build the signaling product that satisfies the customer requirements.
Most of the knowledge is very complex and is deeply embedded in the firm, its 
engineers and its connections with customers and suppliers. There are relatively few 
patents and according to Mr. Swarovski, their importance to the company is slowly 
decreasing. Technologies in general are being developed faster, and product life cycles 
are shortening. “Before, it was ten years for the signal. Now, it’s two-three years”, said 
Mr. Silhengst.
An illustrative example of the special knowledge that Swarco Futurit has, is dealing 
with phantom light. Phantom light is an illusion that the light signal is switched on 
when in fact it is not. This can happen when the sunlight falls onto the signal at a certain 
angle, and is reflected from internal structures of the signal and LEDs. In case of traffic 
signals, phantom light is an important safety issue. Swarco Futurit has the knowledge of 
not only how to deal with the problem (some of the more explicit parts of this 
knowledge are patented, e.g. Silhengst et al. (2001)), but also how to simulate, measure 
and evaluate the phenomena, how to specify the requirements related to the phenomena. 
Swarco Futurit also participates in developing standards related to phantom light 
together with European standards bodies.
4.2.3. Partners
Swarco Futurit’s partners can be broadly split up into two groups: suppliers and 
customers. Interestingly, when asked to identify the most important strategic alliances, 
Franz Silhengst (managing director responsible for manufacturing and development) 
has identified partnerships with electronic component suppliers, whereas Friedrich 
Hofstadler (managing director responsible marketing and sales) and Alexander 
Swarowski (managing director of the holding company Swarco Europe, responsible for 
business development) has first named the customer partnerships. The firm has a long
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experience in such international long-term cooperation. The longest lasting partnership 
is active already since year 1998.
Both managing directors of Swarco Futurit have stated that current partners have very 
different interests, and hence in their opinion there is a relatively low likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior.
Suppliers as Partners
Electronic component suppliers tend to be very large companies that manufacture 
components in immense volumes. These partners are usually making designs and 
modifications very specific to Swarco Futurit’s requirements. According to all 
interviewees, it is highly unlikely that these partners would attempt to appropriate the 
knowledge that becomes accessible through the partnership. As Mr. Popp pointed out 
LED suppliers for example have a great know-how in LED manufacturing, but low 
knowledge of optics and relatively low knowledge of LED applications, compared to 
Swarco Futurit.
However Mr. Silhengst did mention an interesting incident. This incident raises doubts 
on the accuracy of perception there is virtually no risk of knowledge appropriation for 
Swarco Futurit. One LED supplier did try to enter level 4 market (see Table 4) after 
learning about the products within the cooperation with Swarco Futurit. After two years 
of development, they have admitted their failure and the fact that they don’t have 
enough skills or equipment to build the final products. The potential competitor 
transferred the results of this work to Swarco Futurit, and continued cooperation in the 
area of LED manufacturing.
45 (74)
Customers as Partners
Main customers and long term partners of Swarco Futurit are large local and 
international system integrators that use the traffic lights in complete traffic 
management systems. With Swarco Futurit they gain access to the plastics tooling and 
design, optical systems know-how, LED application knowledge. Swarco Futurit on the 
other hand, receives scale and sales network from these partners, which is required for 
efficient operation.
4.2.4. Relations
Swarco Futurit at the moment has no equity joint ventures, it only long term contracts. 
“From technical point of view there would be no benefit in a joint venture”, says the 
managing director Franz Silhengst.
Due to complexity of the specifications, importance of quality and availability, the 
relations with the partners are very long term. The contracts are usually about five years 
long, with an option of extension for another four years. Contracts with the same 
partners rarely change over time; if the cooperation goes well, they tend to be simply 
extended.
Issue of trust is definitely present in the relations. It takes time before trust develops. 
Good relations have to be maintained: for example with many Asian partners there are 
around 5-10 visits every year. Mr. Silhengst also indicated that reciprocity in the 
relationship is very important: “If the partner is more open, we become more open too". 
Partner’s business field also affects the level of trust. Clearly the relations will be more 
guarded if the partner’s field is very close. And yet, relational issues in Swarco Futurit 
are not managed and are left to the discretion of the managers who participate in 
communication with the partners.
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Swarco Futurit never had to participate in any legal proceedings in relation to 
appropriation of their explicit knowledge. At the same time Swarco Europe’s managing 
director Alexander Swarowski says that the company is always on the look out, ready to 
prosecute, if it will feel its property rights are violated.
4.2.5. Knowledge Transfer
Knowledge transfer in Swarco Futurit’s partnerships takes place through regular 
communications, company visits, factory tours and exchanges of technical 
specifications. In general communication happens on all levels in the organization from 
top management to the specialists, but it is the product managers who are responsible 
for all communications related to technical issues.
According to railway signal product manager Walter Popp, knowledge transfer and 
exchange in Swarco Futurit partnerships is extremely complex and extensive. Know­
how related communication usually starts with 30-50 pages of specifications, providing 
the base for the exchange. Detailed description of products and components are 
involved, containing a great number of parameters like forward voltages, power 
consumption, wave lengths, angles, changes of various characteristics with the 
temperatures. This communication process becomes very complicated when every 
parameter change has to be confirmed on various levels, and quite often coordinated 
with various other partners. One of the reasons for this complexity is because a large 
number of safety and reliability standards are involved. For example if an LED 
component has to be changed due to availability issues, the parameters have to be 
checked so that the replacement component fits the specifications, and the end customer 
has to be notified of any critical changes.
4.2.6. Knowledge Protection
All interviewees admitted that there are no specific conscious knowledge protection 
mechanisms in Swarco Futurit, i.e. it’s not a strategy by design, but a strategy by
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default. Mr. Hofstadler went even further by saying that this is something that the 
company should probably think more about, since with the company growth, the risks 
increase. And yet, even today there exist a number of factors and mechanisms to 
mitigate the risks of unintended knowledge appropriation in the strategic alliances of the 
company.
Both Swarco Futurit’s managing directors evaluated knowledge appropriation risks as 
quite low mainly due to perceived absence of intent on the part of the partners. “I don’t 
have a feeling that they would go out with this technology, what would they do with it?” 
said Mr. Silhengst. Swarco Futurit is staying in a relatively small worldwide niche 
market that would require significant time and capital investments to penetrate.
Some of the core technologies are patented. Swarco Futurit has a relatively small 
number of patents most important ones of which are world wide. All respondents 
downplayed long term importance of patents for the firm for a number of reasons. Both 
Mr. Silhengst and Mr. Hofstadler said that patents are expensive to maintain for a 
relatively small company like Swarco Futurit, and that the life cycle of the products is 
getting shorter all the time, which reduces the value of patent protection. Mr. Swarowski 
also stressed the fact that competitors are catching up, and patents alone are clearly 
insufficient to stay ahead; one must constantly innovate by improving quality and 
efficiency of the firm’s operations and products.
Contracts are used to reduce some of the risks of cooperation. For example there is 
always a non-disclosure or confidentiality agreement; there are clauses about rights to 
the technologies and IP developed within the partnership.
Another way to reduce risks is the knowledge of relevant standards. Swarco Futurit 
participates in standards development in Europe, which benefits both the end users and 
the firm. Participation in standards development allows the company a greater
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knowledge of all the requirements, and allows the product to be more compatible with 
the standards early on in the design phases.
Knowledge management and protection within Swarco Futurit’s partnerships is 
implicitly the responsibility of the product managers. While there is no formal policy, 
this fact was repeatedly stated by the respondents. Mr. Hofstadler said that everyone is 
responsible for their areas and they are informed of this fact, but at the same time there 
is no standard. Mr. Swarowski also stated that there is informal coordination in relation 
to knowledge issues.
When asked more specifically about what knowledge is disclosed within the 
partnerships, the respondents stated that the communication would usually be very 
open, and if the partner requests for more detailed information, it would usually be 
provided, especially in the case of suppliers. In Mr. Silhengst’s opinion this information 
would be used only to help Swarco Futurit and improve the quality of the components 
supplied.
At the same time some of the information is kept secret. Mr. Silhengst and Mr. Popp 
said that a complete solution is never shared, only required parameters for a concrete 
module, and only at the level required within this partnership. More specifically 
according to Walter Popp, calculations, testing methods, manufacturing details and 
costs are kept secret, while the final parameters are very open.
4.3. Analysis and Discussion
This section will analyze how the case matches the theoretical framework developed 
earlier in this paper. It will describe how the identified factors affect knowledge 
protection within the case company. It will note the observations that fit within the 
framework and the observations that require further analysis. Lastly a revised 
framework will be proposed.
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4.3.1. Swarco Futurit Firm Specific Factors
Swarco Futurit has specific goals within every alliance. Through its supplier 
partnerships Swarco Futurit attempts to access high quality components fitting very 
specific requirements. Through customer partnerships it attempts gain access to larger 
sales networks and to increase the scale of own production. These goals in the context 
of complex technological requirements demand a very high level of cooperation with 
the partner, which increases the risks of appropriation.
Swarco Futurit has an extensive experience in technological partnerships with its 
suppliers and customers. All interviewed directors stated that they didn’t feel that the 
risks and consequences unintended knowledge transfer were significant. Yet 
Mr. Hofstadler admitted that this feeling could be overconfident, simply due to the fact 
that until now there have not been any serious problems.
4.3.2. Knowledge Characteristics
According to interviewees, informally there is grouping of knowledge into one that 
should be shared with the partner and one that shouldn’t be. This matches with the 
recommendation of the framework.
There is also a clear understanding of what are the core competencies of Swarco Futurit. 
It is the design and manufacturing of plastic parts, optics and LED applications. This 
evaluation also matches the suggestion of the framework.
The technical knowledge related to these core competencies is both explicit (e.g. 
product and component specifications) and tacit (e.g. design, testing, manufacturing 
processes). The core explicit knowledge is held within a small number of patents and 
various specifications. According to the respondents the core technological know-how 
is deeply embedded within the company, its processes and its employees. However due
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to sustained cooperation on all organizational levels of the partners, this complex know­
how also becomes susceptible to unintended transfer (Das & Teng 2000).
In contrast with the framework it seems that contracts do affect protection of tacit 
knowledge too, although indirectly. For example Swarco Futurit’s contracts have 
clauses have confidentiality clauses, and clauses about IPR ownership. These clauses 
target explicit knowledge, but at the same time they reduce the perceived partner intent 
to act opportunistically, which in turn reduces the need for other knowledge protection 
means.
The interviewees have said that in their market product life-cycles are shortening, and 
Mr. Swarowski has pointed out that one way to protect competitive advantage is to 
constantly innovate quicker than the competitors. Hence innovation will reduce the 
negative consequences of appropriation of older knowledge.
4.3.3. Partner Characteristics
Swarco Futurit management evaluates the perceived learning intent of their partners as 
quite low. The partners seem to be more focused on accessing Swarco Futurit’s 
capabilities than actively acquiring them (Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004).
However absorptive capacity of the partners can be very high. Even though according to 
the interviewees, there is an obvious gap between the knowledge of Swarco Futurit and 
their partners, this gap is relatively small. The suppliers are often dealing with similar 
components and processes, and the system integrators are actually building systems 
based on Swarco Futurit’s products. An example, when one of Swarco Futurit’s 
suppliers actively attempted to enter the same market, illustrates this point. Even 
without active learning at first, simply by passive accumulation of knowledge during 
cooperation the partner might reach a point, when they feel like it is only a small step to 
achieve the same results, and this perception would prompt them to behave
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opportunistically. This example supports the finding of Baughn et al. (1997) that firms 
tend to underestimate partner’s willingness and capacity for learning.
4.3.4. Relational Characteristics
The respondents have indicated that the issue of trust within Swarco Futurit’s 
partnerships is very important, which is why they actively engage in trust building 
activities (Das & Teng 1998a). There is regular communication and company visits. 
There is also risk taking by being open with the partner about the technical details. 
According to Mr. Silhengst, this openness increases trust between the organization and 
reduces the need for protection. During successful cooperation this reciprocal openness 
is gradually increasing, which improves cooperation and performance of the alliance. 
Reciprocity was also mentioned as a control mechanism by Das & Teng (2001b) and 
was considered specifically applicable in the case of bilateral contract-based alliances.
The interviewees point out the complexity of communications and relations with their 
suppliers and customers. In addition Swarco Futurit participates in standards 
development with European agencies. These complex relations create ambiguity for the 
potential competitors (Reed & DeFillippi 1990), and limit potential risks partner 
opportunism related to knowledge transfer.
4.3.5. Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms
All knowledge transfer mechanisms indicated in the framework are actively used for 
knowledge transfer. For tacit knowledge there are regular communications, company 
visits, factory tours, and for more explicit knowledge there is exchange of technical 
specifications.
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4.3.6. Original Framework Fit
Many of the factors present in the case match the framework developed in the literature 
review very well. The following diagram illustrates how the findings can be placed 
within the original diagram (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Theoretical framework applied to the case of Swarco Futurit
Nevertheless some factors don’t receive much attention within the framework while 
they could have a significant effect on the way a firm would treat knowledge protection 
within a strategic alliance. Observations that are new but that nevertheless fit into the 
existing framework are emphasized in the figure in italic. These observations are 
discussed in more detail in the next section.
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4.3.7. New Findings
Based on the interviews one can conclude, that managers in the company implicitly 
evaluate potential risks before deciding on the control measures, or in this case - 
knowledge protection mechanisms. Partner trust also plays an important role in 
decisions related to knowledge protection. That is why in addition to factors presented 
in the original framework it is important to evaluate how the managers of the focal 
company evaluate trust levels and potential risks, their probability and consequences. 
This link between trust, risk and control seems a close match to the framework proposed 
by Das & Teng (2001a).
Risk perception within the case was affected by various factors mentioned in the 
framework presented earlier in the paper, but new factors were observed too, such as 
contract characteristics, market structure and partner’s position in this market.
Contract characteristics
Based on the case, contract clauses affect the protection levels. Even though contracts 
cannot directly specify tacit knowledge, they can specify enough of explicit knowledge 
which will make it harder to appropriate and apply tacit knowledge. According to the 
interviewees, contracts affect perceived partner opportunism in relation to knowledge 
appropriation and application. Complex contracts are in general are an important feature 
of non-equity alliances especially when high technology is involved and duration of 
cooperation is long (Argyres et al. 2007).
Market Structure / Industry Specifics
Swarco Futurit is in the niche market, with relatively few worldwide and local players. 
To enter the market a potential competitor has to make a significant investment in 
know-how, labs and manufacturing facilities. These significant barriers to entry reduce 
the perceived risk.
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Partner’s Position in the Market
Mr. Silhengst has mentioned that partner’s business field affects their firm’s attitude 
towards knowledge protection. Interestingly this finding contradicts the results of 
Simonin (2004) study, who found out that level of protectiveness was not affected by 
the competitive overlap between the partners.
Firm Size
Size of the company can affect the available protection mechanisms too. Smaller 
companies due to smaller scale of operations cannot afford to have employees dedicate 
a large portion of their time to knowledge management and protection issues. It can be 
speculated that similarly to the Swarco Futurit’s case, where it’s the product managers 
who manage the knowledge related to their products, in many firms knowledge 
management and protection responsibilities would be distributed among various 
employees.
Constant Innovation
Constant innovation was mentioned by the interviewees as an important mean to stay 
ahead and this way protect the firm’s competitive advantage. In case of Swarco Futurit 




Based on the case findings a revised framework can be proposed emphasizing the role 
or risk perception by the managers of the focal firm. This framework is based on 
integrating trust, risk and control concepts from Das & Teng (2001a) and knowledge 
protection concepts from Norman (2002).
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Figure 5: Revised integratedframework of knowledge protection in a contract-based
strategic alliance
The new integrated framework adds an important dimension to understanding of 
knowledge protection in strategic alliances - perception of risk. Based on the cased and 
the extant literature (Das & Teng 2001a) this perception is affected by existing control 
measures (knowledge protection mechanisms) and trust toward the partner. Both trust 
and risk perception are also affected by the firm and partner factors, such as size of the 
firm, industry specifics, firms goals within the alliance, perceived learning intent of the
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partner, absorptive capacity of the partner, and overlap of knowledge between the focal 
firm and its partner. Knowledge characteristics are also an important factor affecting 
choice of mechanisms both for protection and transfer.
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5. Conclusion
This section will conclude the thesis by summarizing the literature review, the case 
study and showing the scientific contribution. It will also present managerial 
implications and suggest themes for further research.
5.1. Summary
There have been numerous studies about knowledge management in strategic alliances. 
However these studies have concentrated on knowledge creation, transfer and 
application. An important issue of knowledge protection within strategic alliances has 
been relatively neglected and there have been few studies about this subject. This thesis 
aimed to provide further insight into knowledge protection in strategic alliances, by 
integrating existing approaches and using an exploratory case study. The research has 
focused on protection of complex technological know-how in contract-based alliances, 
since in these circumstances knowledge is harder to protect and there are fewer means 
to do it.
The research problem of the thesis was:
° How can a firm protect its core competencies in the context of an international 
contract-based strategic alliance when complex technological know-how is 
involved?
The problem was broken down into sub-questions that were answered by the literature 
review and the case study. The review of existing literature identified a number of 
factors affecting knowledge protection in strategic alliances. These factors can be 
categorized as firm specific factors, partner specific factors, relational factors and 
knowledge characteristics. A framework linking these factors with knowledge transfer 
and protection was proposed. The issue of knowledge protection in contract-based 
strategic alliances differs from equity-based strategic alliances, since many equity and
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hierarchical control mechanisms are not available in contract-based alliances. The fact 
that knowledge is complex and tacit restricts protection measures even further by 
making unavailable many of the formal means, such as explicit specification of 
knowledge in the contracts, patents or licenses,.
The case of the Swarco Futurit largely supported the framework, but a number of new 
factors were uncovered and incorporated into a revised framework. The major case 
finding was the effect of managerial risk perception on the knowledge protection 
approaches in the company. Other new factors were the company size, market size, 
industry specifics and the role of innovation.
5.2. Scientific Contribution
This paper expands the body of existing knowledge management research by 
identifying the importance of knowledge protection and the factors that affect it in the 
context of international contract-based strategic alliances. The main contribution of the 
integrated framework is that it stresses the importance of risk perception influence on 
knowledge protection, where risk perception is in turn affected by the protection 
measures themselves, firm characteristics, partner characteristics and trust toward the 
partner.
This case study also matched the claims of a number of previous works. The way 
various factors affected knowledge protection closely followed the proposals by 
Norman (2002) and Baughn et al. (1997). However the case of Swarco Futurit has 
shown that there are more factors that can affect knowledge protection, such as industry 
specifics and risk perception. Co-dependence of risk, trust and control mechanisms has 
been previously described by Das & Teng (2001a). A revised framework integrates 
these approaches and provides a base for further empirical investigation.
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5.3. Managerial Implications
The framework developed in this study can provide guidance for better knowledge 
protection management in strategic alliances. At the moment the approach this issue in 
most firms is informal and unsystematic, but with the growth of the firm and growth of 
importance of knowledge in firms sustained competitive advantage, risks related to 
knowledge appropriation by alliance partners increase, and hence require a more serious 
attitude.
The managers should evaluate all relevant factors and risks associated with unintended 
knowledge appropriation in strategic alliances and device appropriate measures that 
limit these risks. Firm characteristics, partner and relational characteristics, knowledge 
characteristics, knowledge transfer needs and mechanisms, and all the associated risks 
should be kept in mind when engaging in strategic alliances, to be able to implement 
appropriate level of protection.
Depending on the affecting factors, knowledge protection can be implemented in 
various ways. Employees and managers involved in partner interactions should be made 
aware of the issue and the associated risks. Trust building techniques should be used to 
improve confidence level in the partner and reduce the risk of opportunism. Clear 
signals should be sent to the partners demonstrating readiness to act in case of 
opportunistic appropriation and use of important knowledge. Finally complex 




Further research should advance the understanding of knowledge protection in strategic 
alliances. Influence of various factors should be evaluated empirically. For example 
such factors as the focal firm size, industry characteristics, market structure and role of 
innovation can be considered. These factors affect both the level of perceived risk and 
have a more direct effect on the availability of the protection mechanisms. Partner 
nationality is another factor that can conceivably affect both alliance performance and 
knowledge protection (Parkhe 1993b). Knowledge protection can also be evaluated in 
the context of risk management process stages: such as risk identification, risk 
assessment and risk treatment. Effect on contracts on perceived risk related to 
knowledge appropriation should also be considered. Another possible line of research 
can be about the evolution of knowledge protection strategies as the firm grows and 
gains experience from its alliances. Knowledge protection subject is in general under­
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7. Appendix: Interview Guide
Introduce the Interview
° Thank the interviewee for agreeing to the interview 
D How much time do you have for the interview?
D This conversation will be recorded, is that OK?
D Can I use your name in the study?
0 I will provide you with the case report, and if you are interested with the whole 
paper.
Introduce the Research
Knowledge protection in the international contract-based strategic alliances:
a International Alliances / Partnerships - long term cooperation 
D No ownership or equity involved
n Knowledge that is important but that is hard to define, hard to patent, hard to 
document
Background of the Interviewee
D What is your position in the company?
D What are your tasks?
D How long have you been in the company?
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Firm Related Characteristics
° What are the main products of the company?
° What are the core competencies of the company, can you provide examples?
D What type of knowledge is used in your company, can you provide examples?
° Do some important knowledge assets in your company require other assets to 
be used? How does having complementary assets affect your knowledge 
protection strategies?
° Does your company act tough with competitors (legal protections, tough price 
competition, marketing)?
D Do you show to your partners that you are ready to defend your interests?
Alliance and Contract Related Questions
° What kind of international partnerships does your firm have?
° What are the reasons in your company for contract-based strategic alliances 
instead or equity-based strategic alliances?
D What kind of knowledge / technology related terms do you have in the 
contracts?
° Do contracts change over time? Does your approach to contracts with the same 
partner change over time? If yes how?
° How does your firm evaluate performance in the alliance?
Knowledge Related Characteristics
D What kind of knowledge is usually involved in your alliances? Examples?
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What value is assigned to the knowledge involved in the alliance?
Partner Related Characteristics
0 Are partner’s intentions evaluated?
0 Do you evaluate what resources the partner is contributing to the alliance?
D Do previous alliances with the partner affect your knowledge transfer 
processes?
Relational Characteristics
D Are issues of trust managed in your alliances?
° Are social relations in any way managed in your alliances?
D How do the relations with the partner change?
D Do your relations with the end customers affect your relations with the 
technology partners
Knowledge Transfer Mechanisms
° How do you exchange knowledge with your partner?
0 Does your company formally plan knowledge transfer related processes for the 
alliance?




D Does your company evaluate risks related to the transfer technological know­
how?
a Does your company have ready-made routines for strategic alliances where 
learning is involved? Or is it different for every alliance?
D How does your company structure the cooperation with the partner?
D How do your protection measures change with the alliance age?
° Are there persons dedicated to managing knowledge protection?
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